

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 710828



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 28 August 1971*

NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.







*For the President Only*

~~Top Secret~~


# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971  
Weekly average for each month

MAY 1971 - AUGUST 1971  
Weekly data as reported




**US BATTLE DEATHS** rose to 21 from last week's six year low of 10.




**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS**

decreased to 200 from the 235 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE**

consisted of one small, special purpose group with 20 personnel. The infiltration estimate since 1 October 1970 remains at some 75,600-77,600.




**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS**

climbed to 446 from last week's 276, coinciding with the approach of the Lower House elections and the opening of the enemy's fall-winter campaign.




**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION**

dropped from last week's 1,729 to 1,234.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS**

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces increased to 89% from the 83% of last week.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, the early part of the week here covered saw a surge of Communist indirect fire, sapper, and terrorist activity and concluded with another rash of largely minor attacks, apparently designed to interfere with the National Assembly elections. Though Cam Ranh Bay base in Military Region (MR) 2 was hit hard by sappers, the bulk of the enemy's efforts early in the week were concentrated in MR 1. In Quang Tri Province, there were artillery and rocket attacks against South Vietnamese bases just below the DMZ. There are no indications of major enemy moves against Allied installations in the near term, but harassment activity will probably continue at present low levels.

The military situation in Laos remains largely static. In north Laos, irregular forces holding positions covering the north-central approach to the Plain of Jars were pushed back in a series of sharp actions on 28 and 29 August. In the south, the Muong Phalane and Saravane fronts are quiet, and friendly forces are making slow progress toward Paksong.

Combat activity throughout Cambodia remained fairly stable this week, with most of the action deriving from FANK initiatives. Friendly forces conducting CHENLA II, the clearing operation along Route 6, have been advancing slowly and with increasing reliance on air strikes. By 26 August they had occupied the town of Baray without resistance, thus concluding Phase II of the operation. The third phase of CHENLA II envisions the recapture of Kompong Thmar, which is located some eight miles north of Baray on Route 6.

Enemy Infiltration

The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam/Cambodia since 1 October 1970 remains at some 75,600 - 77,600 as only one small, special purpose group was accepted during the past week. Stockpiling of supplies in forward areas near the Ban Karai Pass and the western DMZ routes, however, suggests that Communist logistics forces may be poised for an early start of this year's dry season supply effort. Additionally, a sizable antiaircraft buildup has recently been noted in southern North Vietnam. This buildup is almost certainly aimed at protecting Communist personnel and materiel infiltration lines through the North Vietnamese and Laos Panhandles.

South Vietnam Developments

Almost complete returns in South Vietnam's Lower House election indicate that the government has retained its majority, but the victory of a substantial number of uncommitted independents makes the size of this majority uncertain. Opposition candidates, particularly those backed by the An Quang Buddhists, appear to have won at least 58 seats and hence done well enough to assure the presence of a significant and cohesive opposition bloc. Voter participation was unexpectedly high, ranging from a low of 58.6 percent in Saigon to over 89 percent in three MR 4 provinces. Nation-wide the turn-out was 77.9 percent, which compares favorably with a turn-out of 65.7 percent in the Senate election last year and 73 percent in the 1967 Lower House election. While there was blatant harassment of opposition candidates and evidence of fraud in several cases, the voting procedures were apparently conducted fairly in most areas. The government's security measures were effective, and only a few of the over 7,000 polling stations had to be closed because of Viet Cong-initiated incidents. At this writing, the Lower House elections seem to have provided something for everybody. The high turn-out and generally good security will redound to the GVN's credit and Thieu's supporters will have a comfortable majority in the new Assembly. Thieu's opponents, however, may be emboldened by the strong performance of many opposition candidates.

Communist Developments

At Hanoi's invitation, a high-level Soviet delegation headed by Soviet President Podgorny will visit the DRV in early October. (Such a visit was called for in the joint Brezhnev--Le Duan communique issued this past spring when Le Duan attended the 24th CPSU Congress.)

There have been only two top level Soviet visits to Hanoi in the past six years: Kosygin's visit in February 1965 and his September 1969 visit, when Kosygin led the Soviet delegation to Ho's funeral. The Podgorny visit will help to balance out Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi in early March, and will also enable Moscow to underline its continuing support for Hanoi at a time when Peking is getting ready to receive President Nixon. In North Vietnam, the impending Podgorny visit will probably be played as a major morale-building event, during which the North Vietnamese will undoubtedly seek to obtain public Soviet endorsement of Hanoi's negative reaction to new relationships between the U.S. and Communist China. The polemical Hanoi media campaign implicitly criticizing the Chinese role in recent U.S.-China developments has continued on and off for the past several weeks. On 22 August, Nhan Dan's authoritative "Commentator" leveled a strongly-worded barb at the Chinese (without actually naming them) when he said that one of President Nixon's perfidious tactics is to "spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist heads in a bid to play socialist countries against one another and sow schism among the Communist and workers parties." In the Communist lexicon, "opportunist" is a strong and dirty word.